U.S. Bioterror Detection Program Comes under Scrutiny

A national air sampling system tasked with picking up terrorist biological attacks is facing scrutiny

By Dina Fine Maron

Francisella tularensis. Image: Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services

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A cutting-edge biological terror alert system detected a potential threat in the air one morning back in 2008, threatening to derail then-Senator Barack Obama?s acceptance speech in Denver for his party?s presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention. Initial results from a pricey national air sampling system suggested that bacteria that could cause tularemia had been detected. The microbe, Francisella tularensis, might have been weaponized to cause the infectious disease.

Public health officials sprang into action and tested further samples from the area that triggered the system, but turned up negative results. The alert, like others issued by the system in the past decade, was ruled to be a false alarm. Obama still made his acceptance speech that night, of course, in an open-air stadium as planned. But the system?s critics say BioWatch has repeatedly triggered an alarm when no threat has existed. Now the program faces the scrutiny of Congress.

BioWatch, an alert system designed to be an early detection system for airborne threats such as anthrax and smallpox, was unveiled in 2003 by President George W. Bush. In his State of the Union address, he talked about the system, saying he was, ?deploying the nation's first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack.? Since then the system has cost $1 billion and been met with mixed reviews. A committee convened by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council said in a 2011 report no expansion of the program should be made without better collaboration with the existing public health system. The panel also called for further analysis of the program and how it could be used to reduce mortality and morbidity.

The network of outdoor and select indoor air samplers was installed, under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security, in more than 30 U.S. metropolitan areas to sniff the air for potential threats. The filters from those aerosol collectors are retrieved for analysis in state or county public health laboratories.

While technically the potential threats detected by the system in the past were not false positives?they did accurately pick up tiny, background amounts of DNA from organisms naturally present in the environment? in effect, they were false alarms because they signaled the potential occurrence of a terrorist attack when none had occurred. Some public health officials have said they are hesitant to rely on the program. Others say it is an important piece of the bioterror response puzzle.

?The way I look at BioWatch is that it is a tool,? says Umair A. Shah, executive director of the Harris County Public Health and Environmental Services Department. ?It is one of many tools that are available to public health decision makers and needs to be kept in the context of that paradigm. The sum of all those tools is really how we go about making sound public health decisions.? Sensors in area around Houston and Harris County had the first-ever positive result through BioWatch in 2003. Like the later DNC incident, BioWatch picked up indications of F. tularensis. Those readings also turned out to be a false alarm; BioWatch again had detected organisms naturally present in the environment.

The value of the system, even with its false alarms, is that it could give public health officials the first clues of a bioterror attack. ?You don?t necessarily want to make [BioWatch] less sensitive to avoid false positives,? says Seth Foldy, a physician who works on public health informatics and served on the NRC-IOM panel looking at the program. The tricky part, he says, is finding a way to make the system sensitive enough so that it would pick up actual disease-causing agents in the event of a bioterror threat, but specific enough to be able to distinguish them from very closely related bacteria that may exist in the environment but do not lead to human disease.

Source: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=us-bioterror-detection

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